The Muse has noted that the "common man" of the western territories in 1812 was largely responsible for pressing James Madison to include Canada in the declaration of war. Not everyone agrees with this statement, which has been de rigour for a long time, and indeed, it may be outdated with more recent, modern research. But it's still an interesting topic, for consider this: how could the United States consider taking on the mightiest sea-power in the world with 13 warships? Granted, there was, up front, reliance on privateers (very successfully, too) but if England hadn't already been at war with Napoleon for quite a while, all her land and most of her naval forces occupied in and around Spain, we'd have been mincemeat.
Perhaps the more educated, politically astute elite (who were no longer in power) understood this, and perhaps that's why many of them wanted nothing to do with the war, lest England decide to really "have at it".
But the Muse rather enjoys the image of the toddler taking on his father in a wrestling match, never doubting he can win it.
Now let's move on to Canada, which the "war-hawks" seemed to think would welcome annextion. Apparently after 15 or 20 years, they forgot that 1/3 of Colonial America opposed the Revolution, and left the country. Where did these tories go? Well, not all of them went to England, by a long shot. They went north, to Nova Scotia and Ontario, and were not at all thrilled with the idea of annexation. The common man again at work, it would appear. And these "common men" were landowners and farmers -- not the proletariat that was just then starting to form in the cities, or the "mechanics", by which is meant trades-people and mill workers -- not candidates for the franchise, in Jefferson's mind.
Is the Muse opposed too the Common Man? It sounds like it -- but wait! It was assumed the Common Man would be educated, well versed in civics, being able to read the newspapers and those little tracts that people then were so fond of printing and distributing. It was assumed the Common Man would be capable of reaching well-reasoned positions.
This may have been a little too lofty, Mr. Jefferson.
The Muse fears it still is.
Friday, September 30, 2011
Thursday, September 29, 2011
How Jefferson started the War of 1812
Well, of course, the embargo of 1807 was Jefferson's idea. He thought that the United States could bring enough economic pressure to bear that England would stop the impressment of American sailors thought to be British, and coincidently to discourage the French from harrassing American shipping in pursuit of their war with England (because, I guess, they thought we'd be carrying stuff to England that would strengthen their war effort against the French.) If you can make sense of that statement, you know your history, probably better than does the Muse!
In any case, the Embargo ruined American commerce, and Jefferson ended it just before leaving office, disappointed in the results. Picking up the pieces, the merchant marine once again sailed forth, trying to glean what it could before war actually began (everyone knew it would). What is the connection between Jefferson, Hamilton, and the War?
Well, as I see it, Jefferson thought the franchise should be extended to any man who owned land, because if he owned land he'd no doubt be farming it, and farmers are a pretty good bunch, down-to-earth (literally) and responsible, accustomed to assessing reality and drawing sound conclusions about it. He won, Hamilton lost, and the Federalist position, that would vest leadership in the hands of educated people who knew how to make money, thus keeping a stable and robust economy foremost in mind -- that was no longer the prevailing political sentiment. Certainly promoting a strong economy was good, and no doubt very important to the future of the new nation. But it didn't take into consideration the constitution, which Jefferson had helped to write, about a nation FOR the people and BY the people.
Jefferson's victory meant that citizens of the new territories, quickly settling beyond the mountains, had the vote rather soon. In the years preceeding the war of 1812, eight of them under Jefferson, the new westerners gained quite a lot of power, enough to suggest to James Madison, the next president, that if he'd like to be re-elected in 1812, he'd not only declare war on England over the impressment issue, but he'd announce the goal of annexing Canada in the process.
We can talk about this little party in a later blog, but the point I'd like to make is that the electorate of common men, so favored by both Jefferson and Madison, pushed the United States into a war of much larger dimension than was originally intended. The body politic was already splintered to the point that New England would have seceeded, once the British brought their ships of the line to bear, in order to avoid total destruction (these ships being liberated in the spring of 1814, the subject of another blog). Had they done so, our country wouldn't look as it does today -- (not that many New Englanders would care, at this point!) Not that the Muse thinks New England would have would have become an English commonwealth, but they most likely wouldn't have been part of the United States, either, whose government had brought so much ruin on them. And might yet.
We'll work on these other aspects another day -- why the westerners wanted war with Canada, how it was that Britain could have descimated us, once the Napoleonic Wars were over, why anyone would have thought Canada would have wanted to be annexed, why the American people thought their 12-13 ship navy could defeat the mightiest sea-power in the world...
The common man, sometimes, isn't really down to earth at all.
In any case, the Embargo ruined American commerce, and Jefferson ended it just before leaving office, disappointed in the results. Picking up the pieces, the merchant marine once again sailed forth, trying to glean what it could before war actually began (everyone knew it would). What is the connection between Jefferson, Hamilton, and the War?
Well, as I see it, Jefferson thought the franchise should be extended to any man who owned land, because if he owned land he'd no doubt be farming it, and farmers are a pretty good bunch, down-to-earth (literally) and responsible, accustomed to assessing reality and drawing sound conclusions about it. He won, Hamilton lost, and the Federalist position, that would vest leadership in the hands of educated people who knew how to make money, thus keeping a stable and robust economy foremost in mind -- that was no longer the prevailing political sentiment. Certainly promoting a strong economy was good, and no doubt very important to the future of the new nation. But it didn't take into consideration the constitution, which Jefferson had helped to write, about a nation FOR the people and BY the people.
Jefferson's victory meant that citizens of the new territories, quickly settling beyond the mountains, had the vote rather soon. In the years preceeding the war of 1812, eight of them under Jefferson, the new westerners gained quite a lot of power, enough to suggest to James Madison, the next president, that if he'd like to be re-elected in 1812, he'd not only declare war on England over the impressment issue, but he'd announce the goal of annexing Canada in the process.
We can talk about this little party in a later blog, but the point I'd like to make is that the electorate of common men, so favored by both Jefferson and Madison, pushed the United States into a war of much larger dimension than was originally intended. The body politic was already splintered to the point that New England would have seceeded, once the British brought their ships of the line to bear, in order to avoid total destruction (these ships being liberated in the spring of 1814, the subject of another blog). Had they done so, our country wouldn't look as it does today -- (not that many New Englanders would care, at this point!) Not that the Muse thinks New England would have would have become an English commonwealth, but they most likely wouldn't have been part of the United States, either, whose government had brought so much ruin on them. And might yet.
We'll work on these other aspects another day -- why the westerners wanted war with Canada, how it was that Britain could have descimated us, once the Napoleonic Wars were over, why anyone would have thought Canada would have wanted to be annexed, why the American people thought their 12-13 ship navy could defeat the mightiest sea-power in the world...
The common man, sometimes, isn't really down to earth at all.
Thursday, August 4, 2011
The American Dream
I'm re-reading James Truslow Adam's The Epic of America. I used it as a reference for a book I wrote 35 years ago, and when I look at it again today, I'm as amazed by it as I was before. It's really a very long essay, showing how the disperate fragments of our history fit together, like a puzzle.
I am reminded of Thomas Jefferson's dream when I read this book, and since I'm blogging about the War of 1812, nearly ready to discuss the Embargo of 1807 as a precursor to it, I find myself having to go back a bit -- which, at this point in our history, means all the way back -- to Jefferson's philosophy of social contract as opposed to Hamilton's, how and why Jefferson prevailed over the Hamiltonians (Federalist) and how and why this prevailing led to war.
I am reminded of Thomas Jefferson's dream when I read this book, and since I'm blogging about the War of 1812, nearly ready to discuss the Embargo of 1807 as a precursor to it, I find myself having to go back a bit -- which, at this point in our history, means all the way back -- to Jefferson's philosophy of social contract as opposed to Hamilton's, how and why Jefferson prevailed over the Hamiltonians (Federalist) and how and why this prevailing led to war.
Sunday, July 31, 2011
Now for the Muse-ick
I can start playing the Music now (get it? Muse-ick?) :-)
The fun of musing about history is that between the lines there are people who once had to live with the fall-out inevitably created by the decisions of politicians, just as we do today. I last reviewed the known facts about the Chesapeake-Leopard affair -- at least as many of them as we need to know for my purpose, which is an exploration of the social environment in which this particular event occured, and what sort of people were witness to it.
The year is 1807. It is reported that the populace was hot for war. America had a navy! It had prevailed over the Barbary pirates just a year or two before (never mind that the pirates were beginning to rise from their defeat) -- a wonderful victory that probably went to most people's heads. What may have been overlooked by this aroused population was that a frigate is a lot smaller that a "ship-of-the-line" which carries three decks of large -- read enormous -- cannons and can blast any frigate out of the water, any time it can catch one. But the frigate, much maller and lighter, can outrun any ship-of-the-line, anytime, so instead of engaging one of these suckers, it cruises around looking for an enemy frigate and challenges that. This seems a little limiting, when you are talking about declaring war aginst the greatest naval force ever seen on the planet. What if England stationed a couple ships-of-the-line outside Boston, New York, Phuiladelphia and Charleston? The population would get pretty hungry pretty fast.
On the other hand, everyone knew that Britain had committed most of her fighting strength against Napoleon Hitler-Bonaparte, who was trying to take over Europe. Mighty as she was, it was unlikely she'd take her greatest asset out of the equation. (This, you may remember, fits into the picture the Muse drew about England's desperate need for sailors, hence the impressment issue.)
Then there was France, which had not been behaving nicely, either, and some people thought we ought to go to war with her, too. But, I suspect, even the man-on-the-street could figure out that the United States wasn't in a position to take them both on.
Now, let's consider the man on the street. He has not been independent of England for very long -- a little less than 25 years, many of them unpleasant until the states unhappily decided they'd have to give over some sovereignty to a centralized government if they were going to be able to borrow enough to pay the war debt and get the merchant marine up and running and money coming in. So subtract ten years -- and we have only 15. Fifteen years of republican government, headed first by George Washington (who probably should be canonized) and now by Thomas Jefferson, a man who champions our friend-on-the-street (though I am totally unclear about why). The aroused population is lamentably inexperienced in government by and for the people, and many members of it probably identify themselves as "former Englishmen". With plenty of experience in self-government, each state is well able to take care of its own business -- but the federal government? Who's kidding who?
Does this sound at all familiar?
Let's consider a few additional pieces of information, relative to life in our country in 1807. "Snail mail" was the order of the day, and snails then didn't move any faster than do snails today. Transatlantic communication took two months, as a rule, sometimes longer -- the War of 1812 was over two months before anyone on this side of the pond knew it. Andrew Jackson fought the British at New Orleans well after the peace treaty had been signed, unknown to either him or the enemy.
This also meant that travel from one town to another was very limited -- in many parts of the country (still clustered on the Atlantic seaboard, with 95% of it rural) -- some people didn't venture more than ten miles from home in their entire lifetime. If you think we have trouble, today, knowing that the media distorts the news, think about the man-on-the-farm. It seems unlikely that he got the straight scoop the first time around, and maybe not the second or third, either.
Next time we make music, let's dig a little further to discover who the American of 1807 was. Even if we're not 100% accurate (who's to know?) we can get a pretty good idea of his general inclination. In particular, I'm interested in the fact that the states (aggregates of Americans), newly entered into an untried social compact, had yet to form a clear idea of what it would mean to be subject to decisions reached by a virtually unknown central governing body, let alone the implications of membership in it.
What "being American" means today is a lot different than it was in 1807.
The fun of musing about history is that between the lines there are people who once had to live with the fall-out inevitably created by the decisions of politicians, just as we do today. I last reviewed the known facts about the Chesapeake-Leopard affair -- at least as many of them as we need to know for my purpose, which is an exploration of the social environment in which this particular event occured, and what sort of people were witness to it.
The year is 1807. It is reported that the populace was hot for war. America had a navy! It had prevailed over the Barbary pirates just a year or two before (never mind that the pirates were beginning to rise from their defeat) -- a wonderful victory that probably went to most people's heads. What may have been overlooked by this aroused population was that a frigate is a lot smaller that a "ship-of-the-line" which carries three decks of large -- read enormous -- cannons and can blast any frigate out of the water, any time it can catch one. But the frigate, much maller and lighter, can outrun any ship-of-the-line, anytime, so instead of engaging one of these suckers, it cruises around looking for an enemy frigate and challenges that. This seems a little limiting, when you are talking about declaring war aginst the greatest naval force ever seen on the planet. What if England stationed a couple ships-of-the-line outside Boston, New York, Phuiladelphia and Charleston? The population would get pretty hungry pretty fast.
On the other hand, everyone knew that Britain had committed most of her fighting strength against Napoleon Hitler-Bonaparte, who was trying to take over Europe. Mighty as she was, it was unlikely she'd take her greatest asset out of the equation. (This, you may remember, fits into the picture the Muse drew about England's desperate need for sailors, hence the impressment issue.)
Then there was France, which had not been behaving nicely, either, and some people thought we ought to go to war with her, too. But, I suspect, even the man-on-the-street could figure out that the United States wasn't in a position to take them both on.
Now, let's consider the man on the street. He has not been independent of England for very long -- a little less than 25 years, many of them unpleasant until the states unhappily decided they'd have to give over some sovereignty to a centralized government if they were going to be able to borrow enough to pay the war debt and get the merchant marine up and running and money coming in. So subtract ten years -- and we have only 15. Fifteen years of republican government, headed first by George Washington (who probably should be canonized) and now by Thomas Jefferson, a man who champions our friend-on-the-street (though I am totally unclear about why). The aroused population is lamentably inexperienced in government by and for the people, and many members of it probably identify themselves as "former Englishmen". With plenty of experience in self-government, each state is well able to take care of its own business -- but the federal government? Who's kidding who?
Does this sound at all familiar?
Let's consider a few additional pieces of information, relative to life in our country in 1807. "Snail mail" was the order of the day, and snails then didn't move any faster than do snails today. Transatlantic communication took two months, as a rule, sometimes longer -- the War of 1812 was over two months before anyone on this side of the pond knew it. Andrew Jackson fought the British at New Orleans well after the peace treaty had been signed, unknown to either him or the enemy.
This also meant that travel from one town to another was very limited -- in many parts of the country (still clustered on the Atlantic seaboard, with 95% of it rural) -- some people didn't venture more than ten miles from home in their entire lifetime. If you think we have trouble, today, knowing that the media distorts the news, think about the man-on-the-farm. It seems unlikely that he got the straight scoop the first time around, and maybe not the second or third, either.
Next time we make music, let's dig a little further to discover who the American of 1807 was. Even if we're not 100% accurate (who's to know?) we can get a pretty good idea of his general inclination. In particular, I'm interested in the fact that the states (aggregates of Americans), newly entered into an untried social compact, had yet to form a clear idea of what it would mean to be subject to decisions reached by a virtually unknown central governing body, let alone the implications of membership in it.
What "being American" means today is a lot different than it was in 1807.
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
The USS Chesapeake
The USS Chesapeake and HMS Leopard met off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia in 1807. Setting out for the Mediterranean, Chesapeake was still sorting through boxes and barrels and organizing armaments when the Leopard, looking for British deserters, hailed her and requested permission to come aboad and search. This situation -- boarding and searching by the English -- was not new. The United States, however, was getting increasingly exasperated by it, and the commander of the Chesapeake was under orders not to submit to such a request. He refused. BANG! The Leopard fired; the Chesapeake, caught with its pants down, couldn't defend herself and the captain surrendered the ship. Leopard, interested in deserters, didn't accept the surrender but only searched for and took four sailors -- only one of whom was British born.
Great public outcry followed, and was compared in intensity to the agitation at the time the British and the American militia met at Lexington. It's this comparison that interests The Historical Muse, for clearly the populace was comparing these boardings, searchings and seizures to acts of war. And now that the United States had a navy which had recently demonstrated its power by bringing the Barbary pirates under control, perhaps there was something the new nation could do about these acts.
As far as I can tell, the US Navy consisted of a dozen armed frigates. No one wanted to spend a lot of money on them, but the merchant marine needed to be protected from the pirates and, of course, Britain had relinquished that job in 1783. By 1800 the government had built six ships (not without a lot of opposition) and several more were built "by public subscription" (in Salem, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston (USS John Adams, not to be confused with the USS Adams, one of the original built by congress.) One other was a converted prize taken from the French.
Clearly the American public thought this was a sufficient force to take on the British Navy, and many people called for war then and there. Had the president, Thomas Jefferson, agreed, then it's likely the most notable aspect of the War of 1812 in New England, secession, would have been avoided. The nation, still a collection of individual states without a real sense of identity as a Union, seems to have coalesced at this juncture. Jefferson preferred economic war, probably thinking we weren't in a really good position to take on the most powerful navy in the world. He was probably right, but most definitely he was wrong in his declaration of economic war the following year, which is the next subject we will Muse about.
Great public outcry followed, and was compared in intensity to the agitation at the time the British and the American militia met at Lexington. It's this comparison that interests The Historical Muse, for clearly the populace was comparing these boardings, searchings and seizures to acts of war. And now that the United States had a navy which had recently demonstrated its power by bringing the Barbary pirates under control, perhaps there was something the new nation could do about these acts.
As far as I can tell, the US Navy consisted of a dozen armed frigates. No one wanted to spend a lot of money on them, but the merchant marine needed to be protected from the pirates and, of course, Britain had relinquished that job in 1783. By 1800 the government had built six ships (not without a lot of opposition) and several more were built "by public subscription" (in Salem, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston (USS John Adams, not to be confused with the USS Adams, one of the original built by congress.) One other was a converted prize taken from the French.
Clearly the American public thought this was a sufficient force to take on the British Navy, and many people called for war then and there. Had the president, Thomas Jefferson, agreed, then it's likely the most notable aspect of the War of 1812 in New England, secession, would have been avoided. The nation, still a collection of individual states without a real sense of identity as a Union, seems to have coalesced at this juncture. Jefferson preferred economic war, probably thinking we weren't in a really good position to take on the most powerful navy in the world. He was probably right, but most definitely he was wrong in his declaration of economic war the following year, which is the next subject we will Muse about.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Prelude to War
The seeds of war were sown in the years between the end of the Revolutionary war and 1812, involving England's insistance on searching for deserters from the Royal Navy, stopping ships at sea and boarding them, taking away the suspects and putting them back in service. The searchers weren't always fussy about the nationality of the presumed desserters, and in the time period mentioned above, impressment of American citizens is reported to have numbered 10,000 men.
England's need for manpower was enormous, and had been since Elizabethan times if not before. There was no way the required crew could be raised by recruiting volunteers, and it would seem that conscription was never considered as a solution to the problem. Hence the dreaded press gang -- an absolute necessity in order to keep the navy afloat. It was sanctioned by the British government.
More seeds were sown as a result of war between England and Napoleon, which began in 1803. At issue were the rights of neutral traders, long recognized internationally. But both England and France instituted blockades against one another, and insisted that if a neutral trader were carrying items that could be used against it, such as food and ammunition, those things could be taken off. Naturally, British naval officers who boarded American vessels bound for France kept their eyes open for "deserters" and took them along with the confiscated items. It was a situation ready-made for hostility. The merchant marine didn't fare much better at the hands of the French, but the issue of looking for deserters wasn't part of the equation.
So between the two of these, anti-British sentiment continued to rise. It boiled over in 1807, bringing the entire seaboard together in protest. See my next blog to find out what this was about.
England's need for manpower was enormous, and had been since Elizabethan times if not before. There was no way the required crew could be raised by recruiting volunteers, and it would seem that conscription was never considered as a solution to the problem. Hence the dreaded press gang -- an absolute necessity in order to keep the navy afloat. It was sanctioned by the British government.
More seeds were sown as a result of war between England and Napoleon, which began in 1803. At issue were the rights of neutral traders, long recognized internationally. But both England and France instituted blockades against one another, and insisted that if a neutral trader were carrying items that could be used against it, such as food and ammunition, those things could be taken off. Naturally, British naval officers who boarded American vessels bound for France kept their eyes open for "deserters" and took them along with the confiscated items. It was a situation ready-made for hostility. The merchant marine didn't fare much better at the hands of the French, but the issue of looking for deserters wasn't part of the equation.
So between the two of these, anti-British sentiment continued to rise. It boiled over in 1807, bringing the entire seaboard together in protest. See my next blog to find out what this was about.
Monday, May 2, 2011
I've looked a bit at sites that I'd hoped would yield information on the planning for the bicentennial of the War of 1812. Of course it's early yet. I expect that closer to the time (June 2012) there'll be more. Already I see that tall ships are due in Boston on July 4, which is always fun.
But in fact this war started long before June of 1812, and I'm interested to see if anyone is looking into the details. The war itself has received bad press, and with good reason -- yet the factors that contributed to it are fascinating when viewed as a snapshot of how the American Experiment was working out at the time. The nation was new -- still a collection of states with different perspectives and little cohesiveness. The War of 1812 is nothing if not a showcase of that! But it's where we started, and I think it deserves a little thinking about.
And so I will think about it.
But in fact this war started long before June of 1812, and I'm interested to see if anyone is looking into the details. The war itself has received bad press, and with good reason -- yet the factors that contributed to it are fascinating when viewed as a snapshot of how the American Experiment was working out at the time. The nation was new -- still a collection of states with different perspectives and little cohesiveness. The War of 1812 is nothing if not a showcase of that! But it's where we started, and I think it deserves a little thinking about.
And so I will think about it.
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